Methods to systematically analyse existing nuclear power plants (NPP) regarding the adequacy of their existing protection equipment against external hazards, e.g. flooding, can be of deterministic as well as probabilistic nature. In the past the adequacy of the protection measures has been assessed only on a deterministic basis. The German regulatory body has issued probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) guidelines, which had been elaborated for a comprehensive integrated safety review of all NPP in operation. Amongst others the guidelines imply, that probabilistic considerations regarding external flooding are required. This paper presents a newly developed graded approach for the probabilistic assessment of external flooding. Main aspects are explained such as the underlying probabilistic considerations and the mathematical procedures for the calculation of exceedance frequencies, which have recently been developed and issued as part of the German Nuclear Safety Standard. Exemplarily it has been investigated if extreme events such as tsunami waves could be a hazard for NPP at coastal sites in Germany. Here it could be shown that due to limited source mechanisms and the specific morphological conditions in the North Sea no dedicated measures for protection against tsunamis in the German Bight are necessary.
Introduction
International experience has shown that external hazards can be safety significant contributors to the overall risk in case of nuclear power plants operation due to their potential to reduce simultaneously the level of redundancy by damaging redundant systems or their supporting systems. In principle methods to systematically analyse existing nuclear facilities regarding the adequacy of their existing protection equipment against external hazards can be of deterministic as well as probabilistic nature. One of the external hazards already addressed in the German Safety Criteria for nuclear power plants (NPP) is external flooding. The German Incident Guidelines require a determination of a sufficient water level as design-basis and appropriate structural protection measures against this hazard in the design of the plants to avoid radiological consequences for the environment. The adequacy of the protection measures have been shown in the past only on a deterministic basis.
New probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) guidelines recently issued by the German regulatory body now prescribe also probabilistic analyses of external hazards (1) . Especially, seismic events, aircraft crash and external flooding are highlighted. The assessments for these external hazards can be very comprehensive and inadequate, for example when the NPP is located in a seismic free area, far away from any airport or when the NPP site is significantly higher than the flat surroundings which is the case for one NPP in the northern part of Germany. Additionally, the collective experience with probabilistic safety assessment of external flooding is limited. Therefore, it is necessary to identify parts of a NPP where no further analysis is required or to apply graded procedures which take into account plant-and site-specific conditions for the respective hazard. Appropriate screening procedures are those which on the one hand allow to constrain the complexity of the analysis and, on the other hand, ensure that relevant information are not lost during the screening process and that all safety significant parts of the plant are taken into account. The approach for these screening processes is different for each type of external hazard.
The German Guide on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, issued in 1997, contained reference listings of initiating events for NPP with Pressure Water Reactor (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) respectively, which have to be checked plant specifically with respect to applicability and completeness. Plant internal fires and plant internal flooding were included in these listings, but not explicitly external hazards. In 1997 detailed instructions have been provided in technical documents on PSA methods which have been developed by a working group of technical experts from nuclear industry, authorities and technical safety organizations chaired by Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz (BfS).
In October 2002, the Commission on Reactor Safety of the States Committee for Atomic Nuclear Energy has agreed to a new draft of the PSA Guide, then in December 2002 the licensees explained their comments on this guide. An updated draft had then been completed in September 2004. The corresponding documents on PSA method and data have been revised in parallel and discussed in the respective committees including the German Reactor Safety Commission.
All documents have been issued in autumn 2005 (2) - (4) . Regarding external hazards, the updated probabilistic safety assessment guidelines require probabilistic considerations of aircraft crash, external flooding, earthquake and explosions pressure waves. A graded approach for the extent of a probabilistic assessment in case of external flooding containing deterministic and probabilistic elements has been developed and is described in (3) . This approach takes into account site-specific aspects like the NPP grounded level compared with surroundings level and plant-specific aspects such as design with permanent protection measures and prescribed shut down of the plant according to the instructions of the operation manual at a specified water level which is significantly below the level of the design flooding.
Extent of the graded approach in PSA for external flooding evaluation
With respect to the phenomena leading to a flooding event, in principle the sites can be differentiated as follows: a) Sites on rivers and on inland lakes which are endangered by flood runoffs from the prevailing drainage areas, b) Coastal sites endangered by flood levels of the ocean, c) Sites on tidal rivers endangered both by flood runoffs from the prevailing drainage areas and by flood levels of the ocean. German nuclear power plants were erected at sites of type a) without inland lakes and type c). In the first case a high water-level situation may arise from an unfavourable ratio of water inflow to outflow, in the second case the coincidence of storm, flooding and high tide is the determining factor.
In the proposed method, the yearly probability of reaching extremely high water levels (in the following named as exceedance frequency) is determined by an extrapolation of actually measured water-level data according to various established methods (5) - (6) . The underlying probabilistic considerations and mathematical procedures to calculate the exceedance frequencies has recently been developed and issued in November 2004 as part of the German Nuclear Safety Standard "Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (7) .
The main two substantial modifications and innovations of the revised standard are: The design of the protection of nuclear power plants against flooding emanates from a rare flooding event with an exceeding frequency of 10 -4 /y, but it is underlined that the methods used to determine the design water level must be different for river sites without and for sites with tidal influences. For river sites without tidal influence, the design water level can be assessed using the runoff of the river with the given exceeding frequency as basis. For river sites with tidal influences, an extreme flood event -tide combined with storm water level set-up -must be assumed. Therefore, it is necessary to determine statistically the storm-tide water level with an exceeding frequency of 10 -2 /y plus a site-specific addend. In conclusions, a storm-tide must be covered with an exceeding frequency of 10 -4 /y.
The graded approach for external flooding can be summarized as given in Table 1 .
Criterion Extent of analysis In the context of the analysis, design-basis flood is that particular flood event on which the flood protection of the plant is based, specifically with regard to meeting the safety objectives. The permanent flood protection is that flood protection which is effective at all times (e.g. protection by flood-safe enclosure, by structural seals). The loads due to the design-basis flood must be combined with other loads:
• external loads of normal usage (e.g. dead load, live load, operational loads, earth thrust, wind load), • loads due to the design-basis flooding (e.g. static water pressure due to the design water level, streaming water, waves, upswing, flotsam, ice pressure), • loads of events as a consequence of the design flooding (e.g. undermining, erosion).
Steps of the external flooding analysis
The probabilistic safety assessment of external flooding can be distinguished into four main steps:
• hazard analysis of the site, • check that starting from an assumed water level of the plant which is equivalent with the design-basis flood, the non-availability of safety functions for the electrical energy supply and for the residual heat removal in a time schedule of five days for river sites and one day for tidal sites is less than 10 -2 /y, • analysis of the event sequence and quantification of the contributions to the total frequency of core damage states, • conduct of an uncertainty analysis.
4. Determination of flood runoffs and storm tide water levels with a probability value of 10 -4 /y
Basics
The flood protection for nuclear power plants in accordance with the safety standard (7) presumes a flood event with a probability value (p-value) of 10 -4 /y, i.e. an extremely seldom flood event. Depending on whether the site is located on inland waters or on coasts with or without tidal waters, different procedures are required for determining the design-basis water level in the vicinity of the plant components to be protected and in the vicinity of the protective structures of the nuclear power plant. In the case of inland water sites, the base assumption is a flood runoff with this p-value for the respective water body. A procedure for determining such a seldom flood runoff is presented in Section 4.2. In individual cases other site-independent procedures may be employed (5) . For inland water sites both the conditions at the site (maximum possible flow)
as well as the large-area water retention effects of the water catchment area (water shed) shall be taken into consideration. In the case of such a seldom flood event it cannot be assumed that the inland water dyke system in the water catchment area will still be fully effective.
In the case of coastal sites and sites on tidal waters, the base assumption is a storm-tide water level with this probability value. A procedure for determining such a seldom flood level is presented in Section 4.3. On the basis of the flood runoff or of the storm tide water level, the corresponding site specific water level in the vicinity of the plant components to be protected and the protective structures of the nuclear power plant shall be determined, e.g. by hydraulics calculations.
Determination of water runoffs for a flood with a probability value of 10 -4 /y for inland water sites
To determine the decisive water runoff of floods for inland water sites, a statistical extrapolation based on the convention introduced by (5) covering the simultaneous occurrence of unfavorable influences shall normally be employed. In this case the following standardized distribution function shall be employed in its expanded form:
where HQ (10 -4 ) : peak-level water runoff of a flood with a probability value of 10 -4 /y, in m³/sec, MHQ:
average peak-level water runoff of a flood over an extended measurement period, in m³/sec, s HQ : standard deviation of peak-level water runoff of a flood over an extended measurement period, in m³/sec, k (10 -4 ) :
frequency factor for an event with the probability value 10 -4 /y.
In this procedure the peak-level water runoff of a flood event with a probability value of 10 -4 /y is extrapolated from the peak-level water runoff of a flood event with a probability value of 10 -2 /y. Hereby, it is assumed that the peak-level water runoff of a flood event with a probability value of 10 -2 /y is determined using standard statistical procedures (8) . The extended extrapolation is then performed using the Pearson-III probability distribution. This is the basis on which the necessary frequency factors are determined. The convention introduced by (5) calls for a maximization of the skewness coefficient, c, to the value of c = 4. The skewness of the distribution function represents decisive capabilities of the drainage area. It serves for reduction of the subjective part of peak-level water runoff estimation at very low probability values. Such contributing characteristics resulting from regional analyses can be e.g. the territorial expansion of the drainage area, the water storage capability of the ground as well as the temporal change of the extreme peak-level water runoff induced by climate change and human impact. The statistical parameters MHQ and s HQ and the actual skewness coefficient, c, shall be calculated from the observed data of a representative flood level. The frequency factor, k (10 -4 ) , shall be calculated as the product of the frequency factor, k (10 -2 ) , and a quotient, f, as follows:
The frequency factor, k (10 -2 ) , for a flood with the probability value of 10 -2 /y shall be interpolated from Table 2 
The quotient, f, shall be calculated for a maximized skewness coefficient, c = 4, from the frequency factor, k (10 -4 ) max , and from the frequency factor, k (10 -2 ) max , as follows f = k (10 -4 ) max / k (10 -2 ) max = 12.36/4.37 = 2.8
Both frequency factors are independent of site-specific data.
Derivation of water levels for a storm tide with a probability value of 10 -4 /y for coastal sites and sites on tidal waters
The storm tide water levels for nuclear power plants on coastal sites and sites on tidal waters shall normally be derived employing the following statistical extrapolation procedure. The water level for a storm tide with a probability factor of 10 -4 /y, SFWH (10 -4 ), shall be determined as the sum of a base value, BHWH (10 -2 ) , and an extrapolation difference, ED, as follows:
where BHWH (10 -2 ) : base value of the water level for a storm tide with a probability value of 10 -2 /y at the site, ED: extrapolation difference representing the water level difference between the water level of a storm tide with a probability value of 10 -4 /y and the base value.
The base value, BHWH (10 -2 ) , shall be determined on the basis of a quantitative statistical extreme-value analysis (in accordance, e.g., with (9) - (10) ) taking relevant parameters (8) into
consideration. The quality of the data shall also be taken into consideration. The base value can be determined employing suitable statistical procedures, because • the spread of the base values, BHWH (10 -2 ) , is relatively small due to the usually extensive and high quality water-level time series available for coasts and tidal waters, • the BHWH (10 -2 ) water level as a function of the observation duration of the individual time series still is partly in the interpolation region or in the near extrapolation region, • the BHWH (10 -2 ) water level is assured by extensive investigations and is verifiable by physical as well as numerical models. The water-level data shall be homogenized considering that the storm-tide water levels are dependent on the development of the water level at the coast -especially the secular rise of the sea level -as well as on the anthropogenic changes to the tidal waters. The extrapolation difference for coasts or for the mouths of tidal rivers shall be determined, e.g., in accordance with (9) - (10) . The local tide-related excessive wave amplitude is not included in the extrapolation difference. The extrapolation difference ED has to be determined and verified site-specifically using appropriate tools (6) . This has been exemplarily calculated for the site Brokdorf Table2 Frequency factors, k, for an event with a probability factor of 10 -2 /y and the actual skewness coefficient, c, of the observed data
Results of a sensitivity study for a flood event with extreme waves in the German north sea
PSA regulations consider extreme events of recurrence intervals of 10000 years. Beside the frequently occurring extreme storm surges, also other events are to be considered. One example is the possible impact of an extreme wave triggered by an offshore landslide. Geotechnical records give evidence for three tsunamis in the North Sea between 8000 and 1500 years ago (12) . One well explored source region is the Storegga slide, which was released approximately 8100 cal years bp (13) .
In the framework of a dedicated study on behalf of BfS, a numerical model was applied by the Center of Marine Environmental Sciences (MARUM) of University of Bremen to simulate the propagation and development of extreme waves in the North Sea towards the German Bight. Based on the implicit finite differences modelling system Delft3d-Flow (14) -- (15) , a hydrodynamic numerical model of the European continental shelf sea has been set-up in order to provide high resolution data on the hydrodynamics of the North Sea (16)--(17) .
In this modelling system, the depth-averaged shallow water equations are solved on a spherical grid. This grid covers the region between W13/N48 and E13/N62 with a resolution of 2.5 nautical miles (1/24°) in the latitudinal and 3.75 nautical miles (1/16°) in the longitudinal direction in discrete time-stepping (Fig 1) . The model bathymetry was interpolated from sea floor topography derived by satellite altimetry (18) and digitized sea-charts. For the study discussed in the following the propagation of an extreme wave event (tsunami) initiated by a hypothetical slide at the continental margin off the Norwegian continental margin has been simulated. Soliton waves were prescribed as water level boundary conditions at the northern open sea boundary of the model.
As the real height of a possible wave cannot be assessed, a range of different wave heights were tested. Simulations show the propagation of the wave across the model domain, considering uniform mean sea level as initial surface elevation condition: After entering the North Sea through the northern boundary, the wave is partly deflected towards the West, because of Coriolis force effects, and partly moves in southern direction through the Norwegian deep. The deflected wave then approaches the British East coast and partly reflects back into the North Sea. Here the primary wave and the reflected wave super-impose into complex patterns. It takes about 8.5 hours for the first wave to reach the German Bight.
The heights and characteristics of the waves at the three coastal stations (a), (b) and (c) in Fig. 2a are similar, all featuring the first direct wave, and about four hours later the reflected wave, which then reaches higher maximum water levels. A regression of boundary condition wave height and maximum water level at the three stations was derived (Fig. 2b) . Generally a significant reduction in wave height from the boundary to the German Bight due to bottom friction can be observed.
The characteristics of the wave triggered by the ancient Storegga event were simulated by Bondevik et al. (12) . Considering their calculated wave height of 3 meters at the Northern boundary of the model, results in maximum deviations of about 0.5 to 0.7m at the tidal gauges in the German Bight. In contrast to the simulations described above, the natural hydrodynamics of the North Sea are driven by tidal and meteorological forcing. Thus the super-position of the extreme wave with the astronomical tidal conditions of the North Sea has been simulated. The results of these simulation are shown in Fig. 3 .
Although non-linear effects are obviously present, generally a linear superposition of tidal elevation and extreme wave dimensions based on uniform mean sea level seem to be possible. It is noted that in the German Bight the transformed extreme wave is of much smaller height than the astronomical tidal signal: The effect of an extreme wave at the gauges Helgoland and Cuxhaven results in less than 10% of the tidal range and only one fifth of the expected surface elevation of a light storm flood, as defined by German hydrographic agencies. Fig.3 Superposition of tides and extreme wave signal in the German Bight Similarly at gauge "Lighthouse Alte Weser", the extreme wave is damped to 0.55m, which is about 17 percent of the tidal range and less than one third of a light storm flood. Considering the natural hydrodynamic conditions as tides and storm surges of the German Bight, the modelled impact of an extreme event that could be triggered by mass slide events at the northern continental margin, seems negligible.
Conclusions
The probabilistic assessment of external hazards performed within comprehensive safety reviews of NPP in Germany starts with a screening process. For those areas which have not been screened out or where a coarse meshed analysis is not sufficient it is compulsory to conduct a quantitative analysis determining the frequency of initiating events induced by the respective hazard, the main contributors and the calculated core damage frequency. Because the probabilistic assessment of external hazards has not yet achieved the same level of methodological maturity as for an internal event PSA, it is intended to conduct pilot studies to get feedback from these analyses for an improvement of the German guidance documents.
The results of a simulation study have shown that an extreme wave in the North Sea towards to the German Bight triggered by an offshore landslide did not indicate significant impacts on the flooding risk of coastal sites.
